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O P I N I O N 
   
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
Cornerstone Residence, Inc. is a non-profit corporation established to operate 
sober living residences for recovering drug and alcohol addicts.  It wanted to establish 
one such residence in the City of Clairton, so it executed an agreement of sale to purchase 
a house and sought an occupancy permit from the City.  Cornerstone argues that the City 
considered the residence to be a Treatment Center and denied its application because 
such centers were not permitted in that location.  Cornerstone challenged this denial, 
urging that the City is discriminating against recovering addicts in violation of the Fair 
Housing Amendments Act (“FHAA”).  In its view, the zoning ordinance (“the 
Ordinance”) that the City purportedly relied on to deny its application was both 
discriminatory as applied to Cornerstone and discriminatory on its face.  The District 
Court dismissed both claims.  
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Cornerstone appeals only the facial challenge.  It argues that the definition of 
Treatment Center in the Ordinance facially discriminates against recovering addicts—a 
protected group under the FHAA—by limiting where residences that serve them may be 
located.  We agree, however, with the City and the District Court that the Ordinance does 
not facially discriminate against recovering addicts.   Therefore, we will affirm the 
District Court’s order.  
I 
Cornerstone brings only a facial challenge.  Thus, Cornerstone’s claim requires us 
to determine whether the explicit terms of the Ordinance are discriminatory.  This inquiry 
is largely one of statutory interpretation.  Therefore, we will limit our background 
discussion to the Ordinance and the FHAA.   
Like most American cities, Clairton regulates the use of property through zoning 
ordinances.  As relevant here, Clairton does not permit a Treatment Center to be located 
in residential areas.  Clairton Ordinance at Table 301.  The definition of Treatment Center 
encompasses several uses, including: 
A use (other than a prison or a hospital) providing housing for three or more 
unrelated persons who need specialized housing, treatment and/or counseling 
because of … [c]urrent addiction to a controlled substance that was used in an 
illegal manner or alcohol… 
Id. at § 337-12.   
 In 1988, Congress passed the Fair Housing Amendments Act to prohibit housing-
related discrimination against handicapped persons.  Pub. L. No. 100–430, § 6, 102 Stat. 
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1619, 1620–21 (1988).  The FHAA defines handicap as “a physical or mental impairment 
which substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life activities … but such 
term does not include current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance.”  42 
U.S.C. § 3602(h).  The FHAA, therefore, provides that current addicts are not a protected 
group.  However, we have held, consistent with other courts, that recovering addicts are.  
See Lakeside Resort Enterprises, LP v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Palmyra Twp., 455 F.3d 154, 156 
n.5 (3d Cir. 2006) (“We note that at least two other courts have held that recovering 
alcoholics and drug addicts are handicapped, so long as they are not currently using 
illegal drugs.”). 
Cornerstone brought both an as-applied and a facial discrimination claim under the 
FHAA at the District Court.  The District Court granted the City’s motion to dismiss both 
claims.  First, the Court held that Cornerstone’s as-applied challenge was not ripe, as 
Cornerstone had not exhausted its administrative remedies by appealing its denial to the 
Zoning Board.  Second, although the Court found that Cornerstone’s facial claim was 
ripe under Third Circuit precedent, see County Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 
F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2006), it held that the definition of Treatment Center did not 
violate the FHAA.  Cornerstone appealed the District Court’s dismissal of its facial 
challenge.1  
 
                                              
1 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We 
have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review this grant of a 
motion to dismiss de novo.  Fallon v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. of Se. Pennsylvania, 877 
F.3d 487, 489 n.5 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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II 
Typically, a plaintiff is required to show that “some discriminatory purpose was a 
‘motivating factor’” to prevail in a FHAA claim.  Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. 
Auth., 421 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2005).  But such a showing is not required “where a 
plaintiff demonstrates that the challenged action involves disparate treatment through 
explicit facial discrimination.”  Id.  Because Cornerstone attempts to show this sort of 
“explicit facial discrimination,” we focus on the “explicit terms of the discrimination” as 
opposed to the manner in which it was applied to the plaintiff.  Id. (citing Int’l Union, 
United Auto. Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 
187, 199 (1991)).   
We apply Pennsylvania law when interpreting a municipal ordinance.  See 
Borough of Fleetwood v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Borough of Fleetwood, 538 Pa. 536, 548 
(Pa. 1994).  Accordingly, we are guided by the rules set forth in the Statutory 
Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921, as interpreted by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court.  These rules instruct us that “[z]oning ordinances are to be construed in 
accordance with the plain and ordinary meaning of their words.”  Upper Salford Twp. v. 
Collins, 669 A.2d 335, 337 (Pa. 1995).  “Where the words in an ordinance are free from 
all ambiguity, the letter of the ordinance may not be disregarded under the pretext of 
pursuing its spirit.”  Bailey v. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment of City of Philadelphia, 569 Pa. 
147, 163 (2002).  But when the ordinance is not clear, the legislature’s intent may be 
discerned by considering a variety of other factors. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921 (c).  
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Cornerstone advances two main arguments in support of its argument that the 
Ordinance facially discriminates against recovering addicts: first, the phrase “was used” 
expands the phrase “current addiction” to include recovering addicts; and second, the 
context and structure of the Ordinance reflect the legislative intent to adopt that meaning.  
We find, however, that the text is clear: housing for recovering addicts is not included in 
the definition of Treatment Center.  Furthermore, even if the text was ambiguous, the 
overall structure and surrounding circumstances of the Ordinance evince a legislative 
intent consistent with our reading.  
A 
 First, the plain meaning of the definition of Treatment Center does not include 
recovering addicts.  The plain meaning of “[c]urrent addiction to a controlled substance 
that was used in an illegal manner or alcohol” is most naturally read to be limited to 
current addicts.  Clairton Ordinance at § 337-12 (emphasis added).  But Cornerstone 
argues that the phrase “was used” transforms the term “current addiction” into “current 
and past addiction.”  The thought being: a current addiction to a drug that was used 
implies that the use and addiction are in the past and, therefore, not current. 
This interpretation places inordinate weight on the phrase “was used.”  The use of 
this phrase (albeit a past tense verb phrase) is no reason to depart from the otherwise 
plain meaning of “current addiction.”   This becomes evident when one considers that a 
current addiction “does not require that a drug user have a heroin syringe in his arm or a 
marijuana bong to his mouth at the exact moment contemplated.”  Shafer v. Preston 
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Mem. Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 278 (4th Cir. 1997).  One can be currently addicted to 
a drug that was used in the past.  That the use occurred in the preceding days or weeks 
does not alter one’s status as a current addict.  See, e.g., Salley v. Circuit City Stores, 
Inc., 160 F.3d 977, 980 n.2 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding, under the ADA, that the term “current 
user” includes individuals who have abstained from drug use for three weeks). 
B 
 Second, even if the terms of the Ordinance were ambiguous, the overall context of 
the Ordinance confirms the City’s interpretation.  When discerning the legislative intent 
of an ordinance, we presume that law-makers are “knowledgeable about existing law 
pertinent to the legislation it enacts.”  Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 
184-85 (1988); see also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c) (“When the words of the statute are not 
explicit, [courts may consider] other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.”).   
With this principle in mind, we find that the Ordinance, read as a whole, reflects a 
familiarity with and an intent to conform to the FHAA.  The Ordinance includes another 
category, “Group Homes,” that would seem to encompass recovering addicts, as it states: 
“[i]t is the express intent of the City to comply with all provisions of the Federal Fair 
Housing Act, as amended, and regulations promulgated thereunder, in the construction of 
this term.”  Zoning Ordinance at § 337-12.  This is consistent with the definition of 
Treatment Center, in which the language closely mirrors the language of the FHAA: 
“[c]urrent addiction to a controlled substance that was used in an illegal manner or 
alcohol” is nearly identical to the FHAA’s description of the unprotected classification; 
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namely, “addiction caused by current, illegal use of a controlled substance.”  These 
considerations favor reading the Ordinance in harmony with the FHAA.  Thus, Treatment 
Center would include only the unprotected class.2 
III 
 For these reasons, we find that the Ordinance does not facially discriminate 
against recovering addicts in violation of the FHAA.  Therefore, we will affirm the 
District Court’s order.   
                                              
2 Because we are not presented with an as-applied challenge, we do not reach the issue of 
whether Cornerstone’s operations were properly considered to be a Treatment Center.  
